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Climate change represents a serious threat to the health of our
planet and imposed a discussion upon energy waste and produc-
tion. In this paper we propose a smart grid architecture relying
on blockchain technology aimed at discouraging the production
and distribution of non-renewable energy as the one derived from
fossil fuel. Our model relies on a reverse application of a recently
introduced attack to the blockchain based on chain forking. Our sys-
tem involves both a central authority and a number of distributed
peers representing the stakeholders of the energy grid. This sys-
tem preserves those advantages derived from the blockchain and
it also address some limitations such as energy waste for mining
operations. In addition, the reverse attack we rely on allows to
mitigate the behavior of a classic blockchain, which is intrinsecally
self-regulated, and to trigger a sort of ethical action which penalizes
non-renewable energy producers. Blacklisted stakeholders will be
induced to provide their transaction with higher fees in order to
preserve the selling rate.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Since its introduction [7], blockchain has been one of the most dis-
ruptive and promising new technologies, with applications across
a wide range of scenarios, well beyond information and communi-
cation technology, including economics, law and so forth.
A blockchain is normally defined as a shared distributed ledger of
transactions. In general, blockchain technologies offer a distributed
platform where participants can record their interactions (such as
the exchange or transmission of currency, as in the case of Bitcoin).
The transactions composing the blockchain are typically ordered in
structured blocks through a linked list, which uses a hash pointer to
the preceding block. Hash pointers prevent changes to information
stored on previous blocks of the blockchain.
The validity of the recorded transactions is ensured through the
shared storage of the ledger information on all the nodes participat-
ing to the peer-to-peer blockchain network, as well as a distributed
consensus mechanism. The latter provides the way through which
new blocks (and the transactions recorded therein) are added to
the blockchain. This is one of the areas where research as been
the most active. The original Bitcoin proposal is based on a proof
of work (PoW): in particular, in order to introduce a new block
participants need to prove they used a specific amount of compu-
tational resources. This is achieved by way of solving a specific
computational challenge. Peers participating in the resolution of
the challenge are called miners. The challenge should be computa-
tionally difficult to solve, but simple to verify. Miners collaborate
in the distributed effort to solve the challenge, and the probability
a specific miner will be the one eventually finding the correct so-
lution should only depend on its relative share of computational
resources. Once found by a miner, the solution is shared across the
network, which verifies its validity. In the case of Bitcoin, the proof
of work is
H (nonce | |P_hash | |Tx1 | | . . . | |Txn ) < tarдet (1)
where P_hash is the hash of the preceding block (the hash pointer),
Tx are the n transactions to be recorded in the current block, tarдet
is the challenge difficulty, and nonce is any value for which the hash
of the concatenation of the nonce itself, the preceding hash and
the transactions is less than the target value. The PoW is therefore
the search of a nonce satisfying the equation, normally performed
as an exhaustive search (brute force). An advantage of the proof
of work approach is embedded resistance to Sybil attacks and dou-
ble spending [1]. However, it also implies a significant amount of
computation (and the associated energy consumption) is wasted
for every block created, as the solution will be found by one peer
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and all other peers will have worked in vain. PoW blockchains
are also prone to frequent forking, where two or more blocks are
produced with the same hash pointer. This can happen, for instance,
if two peers find the same solution (or two valid solutions) at the
same time. Forks are normally resolved by adoption by the network
through consensus of the longest fork path, for which the highest
amount of computational work has been performed.
An alternative to proof of work is proof of stake (PoS). In this
common approach, the creation of a new block is assigned prob-
abilistically to one of the network participants according to its
relative stake (or share) in the network. This reduces significantly
the computational resources needed, and the related energy con-
sumption.
In order to motivate peers to participate in the mining (the com-
putation needed to solve the challenge), blockchains use an incen-
tive mechanism. In Bitcoin, the peer that succeeds in creating a new
block is rewarded by the creation of a new coin which the peer will
own. Transaction fees can also be introduced to incentivise miners
to include specific transactions in the blocks they generate. The
fees are normally paid by the peer proposing the transaction once
this has been included in a new block.
1.1 Contribution
In this paper, we present a distributed blockchain-based architec-
ture for the accounting of energy production and distribution in a
smart grid. In particular, we address the incentivisation of green
energy production by introducing an ethical mechanism inside the
blockchain. Through a derivation of the punitive forking blockchain
attack [8], peers in the blockchain can discourage the production of
non-renewable energy under certain circumstances, by increasing
the related transaction costs.
In this paper, we formalize the feather forking attack and we
discuss how it can be applied in the smart grid context for the
proposed purpose. We analyse advantages and disadvantages of
two well-known models designed to achieve distributed consensus
within the blockchain. Finally, we define the architectural aspects
of the proposed solution.
1.2 Related works
The adoption of blockchain technologies in the smart grid domain
has been proposed a number of times. In [5], Li et al. discuss a
peer to peer energy trading system relying on blockchain. This
model is coupled with a credit-based payment scheme to support
fast and frequent energy trading and does not need any trusted
intermediary.
Blockchain is not intended to be only adopted in a world-based
network (as per the Bitcoin case) but is also suitable for urban
contexts [9] and small decentralized markets. In [6] this technology
is at the basis of a local energy market between 100 residential
households. Local energy trading is performed without the need of
a central intermediary.
Many problems connected to the energy Internet may be solved
or mitigated through the adoption of blockchain. In [3] the authors
discuss how to get rid of the huge amount of money and resources
required to purchase and manage energy storage equipment involv-
ing the energy Internet. Again, Pop et al. [10] suggest blockchain as
an enabling technology to allow independent energy trading while
keeping control of local and area-related consumption through
smart meters. This latter system relies on Ethereum platform [12]
and may be conveniently used to enhance energy demand and
production matching.
SolarCoin [11], a global rewards program for solar electricity
generation, should also be mentioned as a successful project rely-
ing on blockchain and applied to the energy production domain.
The SolarCoin Foundation rewards solar energy producers with
blockchain-based digital tokens at the rate of 1 SolarCoin (SLR) per
1 MWh of solar energy produced.
Blockchain technologies also present some drawback. One of
the most engaging problem, especially when we deal with smart
grids and power supply, is the disproportionate power consumption
needed for the proof of work mechanism. Bitcoin represents an
evident example of this paradox [2]. As bitcoin and, more in general,
blockchain solutions rely on fully distributed systems without any
trusted authority, they are vulnerable to attacks by malicious nodes
in the network. As discussed in [1], several attacks addressing
blockchain technologies were proposed in literature, some of which
are based on chain forking. In this paper, we focus on a specific
kind of forking attack known as feather forking [8]. The main aim
of our model consists in a reverse usage of such attack designed to
discourage some specific transactions within smart grid domain.
2 DESIGN AND DISCUSSION
The collaborative architecture we design is built over a network
connecting energy producers and distributors, as well as a national
energy authority or regulator. The network follows a standard de-
centralised peer-to-peer structure, where persistent connections
are established between peers. The nature of the network allows
peers to enter or exit the network dynamically. The peers (or nodes)
composing the network are servers corresponding to energy pro-
duction facilities, or commercial energy distributors. As such, only
nodes recognised by the energy authority participate to the net-
work. In practice, the energy authority could actually provide dedi-
cated hardware to the participants: we call therefore each node a
black box, as the stakeholders are not allowed to tamper with the
functioning of the server. In this context, we assume the parties par-
ticipating to the network will not launch malicious attacks aimed
at disrupting the network or other peers. We assume, however, that
the actors will try to minimise their transaction costs. Transaction
fees, in particular, will be imposed on specific energy production
transactions by non-renewable energy plants, under certain cir-
cumstances. As black boxes are assigned to peers by the energy
authority, each peer maintains a limited degree of anonymity with
respect to other peers [14]. The authority also participates to the
network directly, through a supernode of capabilities that are higher
than regular black box nodes. The transactions that are recorded
by the blockchain architecture are linked to energy production and
distribution: producers will record the amount of energy input to
the grid, while distributors will record energy collected from the
grid, which they will then resell to their customers (households
and businesses). The reselling by distributors is not included in
the proposed architecture: only transaction to and from the energy
grid by energy stakeholders are comprised, excluding final users.
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Our architecture does not introduce any currency. In the proposed
design, all peers who participate to the network also contribute to
the formation of the blockchain, and are as such miners.
Wüst and Gervais, in the paper “Do you need a Blockchain?”
[13], identify the cases in which a blockchain is a potential solution,
and when a problem can instead be solved by traditional means. In
the scenario proposed in this paper, the presence of well-known
and trusted nodes - as all are certified by a central authority - does
not make the adoption of a blockchain-based solution inappropriate.
Indeed, despite these characteristics, the proposed setting includes
the participation of proactive nodes (individual or as a collective)
that can carry out ethical actions independently of the policies
suggested by the central authority. The scheme is not aimed at the
mere application of energy policies imposed by an authority, but at
finding a solution that allows participants to have decision-making
autonomy and in which they can organize themselves to counteract
or participate in the current policies suggested by the authority (e.g.,
possible environmental associations may form "green-cooperatives"
by creating real pools of votes). In this context, producers of energy
from non-renewable sources will also be able to decide whether to
ignore or act accordingly to certain policies. A distributed consen-
sus mechanism is therefore necessary, and a solution adopting a
centralised database is therefore not feasible. This becomes even
more evident with the extension of the energy grid and the conse-
quent inclusion of different central authorities, each with its own
energy policies (e.g regional, national and European authorities).
In this case, the authorities could make different choices or even
act in competition with each other. In such a scenario, the real
difference would be made by the individual nodes and their choices:
to encourage the production of green energy - preferring it when
possible - or to seek a profit through fees?
2.1 Proof of Work vs Proof of Stake
The wide applicability of blockchain to the smart grid domain,
and in particular to the described scenario, suggests solutions that
are not based on the proof of work (PoW) model. As discussed
in [2], as the number of transactions and the related hash rate
increase, so does the computation required and therefore the energy
consumed by the peers, which would appear contradictory to an
energy efficiency goal. An alternative approach is the proof of stake
(PoS) model, as such a choice would reduce energy consumption
by the peers. However, PoS introduces a number of drawbacks: in
particular the nothing-at-stake issue [4], where miners without any
significant stake and therefore nothing to lose have an incentive
in initiating multiple forks. This would allow them to maximize
the transaction fee benefits, as validators could generate conflicting
blocks on multiple forks with nothing at stake.
Moreover, as in the proposed architecture no currency is gener-
ated and transactions record the input or output of energy in the
smart grid, the stake could only be based on the volume of energy
produced/distributed. This would be imbalanced in a setting where
renewable energy (such as solar or wind) producers are normally
in higher number but lower capacity with respect to thermonuclear
or fossil fuel plants.
For these reasons, rather than adopting the proof of stake model,
we opt for a proof of work system where we reduce the hash rate
and therefore the power consumption. Assuming the hardware is
provided by an energy authority, this would prevent a race for com-
putational power and therefore an inflation of power consumption.
As all peers are restricted to the same hashing power, the archi-
tecture introduces a fairness element in the collective behaviour.
Adoption of a PoW system also allows for a more direct introduc-
tion of the feather forking mechanism we present in the following
section, although this would be possible in a PoS scenario as well.
2.2 Feather forking
Feather forking is a subtle modification of the more well-known
punitive forking attack. Punitive forking [8] consists in excluding
someone from the blockchain through a systematic and unbounded
forking operation with respect to those blocks which contain trans-
actions originating from the blacklisted people. Although this attack
is very dangerous (as it could compromise the blockchain usability
completely), it is hard to carry out when the attacker does not hold
the majority of the hash power of the whole system.
Feather forking is much more affordable to be carried out. This
attack can be indeed achieved without the majority of the hash
power. Feather forking shares basic concepts with punitive forking
but differs from it for a crucial detail: when the attacker announces
he will refuse to mine transactions involving a certain person, he
also states he is going to fork the chain for a limited number of
blocks. Specifically, let us suppose a blacklisted transaction has
been inserted in a valid block in the main chain. The attacker could
announce he is going to fork the chain starting from the previous
block (in order to cut off the new undesired block) and he will keep
forking until k blocks will be added to the main chain after the
blacklisted one. As an example, let us suppose k = 1: a feather
forking attack would succeed if the attacker solves two consecutive
blocks while other peers do not attach any consequent block to the
blacklisted one. Conversely, when a single confirmation is provided
for the undesired block (i.e. when a new valid block is added to the
main chain after the blacklisted one), the attack fails. This situation













Figure 1: Feather forking attack with k = 1.
A lightweight probabilistic model may be defined in order to
understand the impact of such an attack on the network. Let α be
the amount of hash power held by the attacker, where α ∈ [0, 1].
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Hash power α P (ff1) Success
percentage probability
5% 0.05 0.0025 0.25%
10% 0.1 0.01 1.00%
15% 0.15 0.0225 2.25%
20% 0.2 0.04 4.00%
25% 0.25 0.0625 6.25%
30% 0.3 0.09 9.00%
Table 1: Feather forking success probability for some refer-
ence values of α . The bounding parameter k is fixed to 1.
Assuming all other peers keeps working on the main chain, there
is a probability α that the attacker finds a valid block for the forked
chain before someone else does on the main chain. However, we
know that the attacker needs to find k + 1 consecutive blocks in
order for the attack to succeed.
Definition 2.1. Given a bound k , we define a successful feather
forking attack, and we refer to it as ffk , the event when an attacker
connects k + 1 consecutive blocks to a forked chain before other
peers connect at least k consecutive blocks to the main chain.
For instance, when k = 1, this condition is reached when the
attacker finds two blocks while the rest of peers find none. Thus,
the probability for ff1 to occur is:
P (ff1) = α
2 . (2)
Let us assume α = 0.1 (i.e. the attacker holds 10% of the hash
power). When he performs feather forking he succeeds on the aver-
age one time in a hundred. Again, α = 0.2 implies a 4% of failures
when someone attempts to mine a block containing a blacklisted
transaction, and so forth. Some reference values are reported in
Table 1.
It is important to mention here that this attack can drive several
peers to follow the same behaviour, as blocks involving blacklisted
transactions have a certain probability to be excluded from the
chain (while other blocks have not). Hence, the attacker may trig-
ger a bigger impediment than expected. In practice, however, the
probability of a successful feather fork is always marginal: the best
line of defence for impacted peers is to pay a higher transaction fee,
to ensure the block containing their transactions is more valuable
to the community of miners, and therefore it will be included in the
main chain. Therefore, the main objective of feather forking is to
increase the costs for the victims of the attack, rather than actually
succeeding in forking the chain.
The main idea behind the proposed model is to change perspec-
tive and use this attack as a positive force: in particular, the energy
authority may carry out feather forking attacks to discourage non-
renewable energy production when this is not needed given the
current consumption level. Depending on the hash power the au-
thority has on the supernode it controls with respect to the other
peers, targeted stakeholders will pay a higher fee in order for their
transactions to be validated.
Figure 2: The proposed system architecture, where energy is
distributed from the producers to the grid, managed by the
central energy authority, and then onward to the commer-
cial energy distributors.
2.3 System architecture
The distributed system architecture is comprised of the black box
nodes, each related to an energy producer or distributor, and the en-
ergy authority or regulator, which controls one or more supernodes
with a significant proportion of the hash power. In the following,
we refer to the latter entity as the Energy Central Authority (ECA).
Two other classes of stakeholders compose the network of peers:
Energy Producers (EP), which are energy production facilities such
as a wind farm or a gas power plant; and Distributors (D), which
buy energy from the grid and resell it to individual businesses or
households. We note that even in the case two energy production
plants are owned by the same company, each plant would still be
an independent node on the network, with an individual black box.
Through a standard peer-to-peer structure, each ordinary (black
box) node participating to the network will have access to other
nodes, but will maintain a limited number of active connections.
The number of connections in Bitcoin, 8, seems suitable for this sce-
nario as well. Peers will also have a maximum number of incoming
connections (e.g. 125). Among the connections maintained, peers
should however always select an ECA supernode. Connections can
be kept alive through a system similar to that used in Bitcoin: an
Hello Message to keep the connection alive, and discard the peer if
nothing is heard in the last 30 minutes. The architecture, comprised
of stakeholders divided in 3 categories, is depicted in Figure 2.
We imagine the ECA role will be played by a national or interna-
tional energy authority or regulator, which we assume would have
the legal mandate to impose costs on non-renewable energy, as in
the proposed objective. The ECA will act on the basis of the current
circumstances of the network, by partially regulating the market:
by increasing the costs for specific energy sources, the market can
be expected to self-regulate in the direction of increased usage of
renewable energy. As the decision as whether or not to impose such
costs will ultimately lie on the ECA, its application can depend on
the network circumstances: for instance, we can imagine a scenario
where energy consumption is greater than energy production, for
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which the ECA may decide to temporarily suspend the mechanism.
The ECA is also responsible for the production of black boxes,
which are assigned to each other participant in the network. Where
the black box is assigned to an energy production facility EP, this
will monitor the energy that is input to the electrical grid; where
the black box is instead assigned to an energy distributor D (such
as a wholesale customer that resells to businesses and households),
it will monitor the energy output or consumed. The transaction
recorded in the blockchain will track these inputs and outputs of
energy. Each black box has the same computational resources, and
therefore will participate in the blockchain with an identical hash
power. The supernode held by the ECA has instead a variable hash
power, aimed at maintaining a specific percentage of the overall
network hash rate. All nodes will have a public and private key
pair, and also maintain an up-to-date copy of the blockchain locally.
Only the ECA, however, has direct knowledge of the identity of
all nodes. This will allow it to impose costs through the feather
forking mechanism to specific EPs, which it knows use a certain
kind of energy source.
2.4 Transactions
In this section, we discuss how the ECA can impose a cost on
transactions by specific EP peers through the feather forking mech-
anism, when the EP uses a non-renewable energy source and the
ECA conditions are met.
Transactions in the proposed blockchain are similar to those
in Bitcoin, but with a significant difference: no coin or currency
is produced by the miners. Therefore, the act of mining in itself
will not provide any reward to a miner, and the only reward are
transaction fees. We assume the black boxes will be designed to
mine independently of the reward, as stakeholders have external
interests in participating to the network.
As described in Section 2.2, when the ECA decides to impose
a cost on EPs using a particular source of energy (e.g. coal), it
will announce through the supernode its intention to fork blocks
containing transactions of the targeted EPs, following the feather
forking strategy and using a declared hash power. This hash rate
can be adjusted by the ECA to increase or decrease the cost to the
EP, and according to the grid circumstances.
In order to have transactions validated, and therefore being able
to input energy to the grid, the targeted EPs will have to add a
transaction fee to their transactions. The fee will incentivise peers
to include the transaction on the block, and therefore not partic-
ipate in the fork. The mechanism is in fact successful if the EPs
pay a transaction fee, and not necessarily if the fork is adopted as
main branch. The increased costs of energy production imposed by
the ECA on the EPs is dynamic and adjustable, as the fee will be
proportional to the probability of success of the feather fork (see
Table 1). The cost can therefore be calculated in advance by the
ECA, with the target of a decreased usage of non-renewable energy
sources, without blocking altogether access to the grid.
In Table 2, we distinguish three types of transactions: EP to ECA,
ECA to D, and any miner (peer) to ECA.
In the first case, the transaction will have as sender address the
public key of the energy production facility EP, and as receiver the
public key of the energy authority ECA. The transaction records
Sender Receiver Fee Feather Forking
PubKey PubKey
EP ECA ✓ ✓
ECA D ✗ ✗
Miner ECA ✗ ✗
Table 2: Transaction classes in the proposed smart grid
blockchain.
the energy the EP inputs to the grid. Each transaction could for
instance record that a fixed amount of energy has been input, or
the amount relative to a fixed time duration, in order to standardise
transactions. When the EP decides to add a transaction fee (e.g. to
counter a feather fork), this will be earned by the peer mining the
block containing the transaction. Fees are also energy: the EP will
therefore have to produce more than it sells to the grid.
Once the blockchain has progressed, and transactions are con-
firmed (in the way of Bitcoin), the ECA can distribute the energy
for the recorded transactions to any wholesale energy distributor
D. This interaction is recorded in the second type of transaction.
The third and final transaction class is the withdrawals of earning
due to transaction fees by the miners who “earned” energy in this
way. The peers that have mined blocks and earned the related fees
are able to redeem their value through the ECA. The transaction
records the fees being passed to the ECA, which will pay the peers
an equivalent amount externally to the system after confirmation,
in the same way energy would be paid for by Ds.
As the transactions belonging to the second and third group are
not related to a specific energy source, they cannot be subject to
blacklisting and forking by the ECA. In the event of a successful
fork, normally unlikely but probabilistically possible, the ECA will
earn any transaction fee, and the affected EPs will not have recorded
the energy they input into the grid. The ECAwill therefore discount
the same amount against fees it would have imposed on the EPs
over time. Transaction fees will be, in this case, earned by the
ECA supernode, but the ECA can decide to redistribute them to
renewable energy EPs.
Through the transaction fees imposed by the ECA thanks to
opportunistic feather forking, the proposed model introduces a cost
on non-renewable energy producers, and incentivises green energy
production through the distribution of the transaction fees. While
transaction fees can be earned by non-renewable energy peers as
well, statistically this will only partially reduce their cost. This can
also be predicted by the ECA, and it can be factored in its decision
on the fee level to be imposed, and the consequent hash rate and
maximum number of blocks for the attempted fork.
3 CONCLUSION
In this paper we introduced a novel blockchain-based system aimed
at the regulation of energy production and distribution. A specific
focus was posed on the type of energy which the producer plugs
in the grid. Specifically, we discussed a tailored application of the
feather forking attack designed to discourage the production of
non-renewable energy. This technique seems to be promising and
might be adopted to enhance ethical smart grid systems where both
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a central authority and each participating peer collaborate for a
greener environment.
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